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ABSTRACT
Users on Twitter are commonly identified by their profile
names. These names are used when directly addressing users
on Twitter, are part of their profile page URLs, and can be-
come a trademark for popular accounts, with people refer-
ring to celebrities by their real name and their profile name,
interchangeably. Twitter, however, has chosen to not per-
manently link profile names to their corresponding user ac-
counts. In fact, Twitter allows users to change their profile
name, and afterwards makes the old profile names available
for other users to take.
In this paper, we provide a large-scale study of the phe-
nomenon of profile name reuse on Twitter. We show that
this phenomenon is not uncommon, investigate the dynam-
ics of profile name reuse, and characterize the accounts that
are involved in it. We find that many of these accounts adopt
abandoned profile names for questionable purposes, such as
spreading malicious content, and using the profile name’s
popularity for search engine optimization. Finally, we show
that this problem is not unique to Twitter (as other popular
online social networks also release profile names) and argue
that the risks involved with profile-name reuse outnumber
the advantages provided by this feature.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Social network; OSN; Profile name; Impersonation
1. INTRODUCTION
Users on Twitter are identified by their profile name, such
as @taylorswift13. A user’s profile name is also used to di-
rectly mention accounts on Twitter, as well as to identify
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their profile page’s URL.1 However, Twitter provides pro-
file names as a mere convenience to its users. Internally,
the social network identifies accounts with unique numerical
identifiers, so-called user IDs (e.g., the number 17919972 for
Taylor Swift’s Twitter account). While user IDs are glob-
ally unique and persistent, they are usually not observed by
end-users. With these robust identifiers in place, Twitter
allows users to change the profile names of their accounts
over time. As the concepts of stable user IDs as well as
changeable profile names are crucial to this paper, we will
use the terms user ID and account interchangeably to re-
fer to the persistent notion of an account as identified by
its user ID. Furthermore, we use the term profile name to
refer to the changeable name the user chose for a given ac-
count. There are multiple reasons why a user might want
to change their profile name, including changes of jobs and
affiliations, changes of names due to marriage, or the se-
lection of a different nickname. Interestingly, once a user
changes her profile name, Twitter releases the old name for
other users to adopt. The same happens if a user decides to
delete her account. Only in the case of an account that gets
suspended due to a violation of the terms of service,2 does
Twitter make the profile name unavailable for other users to
adopt.
There are many reasons why a Twitter user might take a
profile name that was previously in use and then abandoned,
both legitimate and malicious. It is possible that a person
innocently selects a profile name that was previously in use,
perhaps because it corresponds to a particularly common
first and last name (e.g., JohnSmith). It is also possible,
however, that a malicious entity will select abandoned pro-
file names on purpose, in an attempt to leverage the residual
reputation that this profile name might have. Miscreants
trying to spread spam on Twitter might use this reputation
in the hope of attracting more followers. Another use of
abandoned profile names is Blackhat Search Engine Opti-
mization (SEO) [19]. Since profile names identify the URL
of the profile pages of accounts on Twitter, once a profile
name is freed there will be multiple links on the web pointing
to a non-existent page. By selecting an abandoned profile
name with many URLs already pointing to it, a malicious
user can start promoting his content and influence search
results. Note that this is not a mere hypothetical scenario;
the practice of harvesting abandoned Twitter profile names
1https://twitter.com/taylorswift13
2https://twitter.com/tos
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and using them for SEO purposes has been observed in the
wild.3
We first introduced the concept of profile name reuse on
Twitter in our preliminary work [20]. In that work, we
showed that profile names are reused in the wild, and we
identified a number of accounts that adopted abandoned
profile names and used them to send spam. In this paper
we perform a more in-depth, larger-scale measurement of
the phenomenon of profile name reuse on Twitter. We show
that over a period of one year, 1% of popular accounts with
more than one million followers that appear in our datasets
changed their profile name, and this name was later taken
by another account. We provide a number of case studies in
which a popular profile name was used to ridicule the origi-
nal owner, or to post malicious content. We also show that
Twitter users often prevent profile name hijacking by creat-
ing placeholder accounts that immediately adopt the aban-
doned profile name and point users to the new one. These
case studies show that there is a concrete threat linked to
freeing abandoned profile names on Twitter.
To understand how profile name reuse manifests at a large
scale, we collected a 1% sample of all public tweets posted
over a period of six months, between October 10, 2015 and
April 12, 2016. In total, we identified 106,935 profile names
that have been shared by 196,200 unique accounts. In doing
so, we identify a set of profile names that were taken over by
multiple accounts during the observation period. We iden-
tify different categories of accounts, ranging from those that
seem to be acting for legitimate reasons to those that re-
peatedly iterate among different profile names with the pur-
pose of spreading malicious content. We analyze the general
characteristics of these accounts, together with the topics
that they discuss on Twitter and the URLs that they post,
finding that accounts that take abandoned profile names are
more likely to post malicious content than regular Twitter
accounts, as well as more likely to be suspended by Twitter.
Although this paper focuses on Twitter because of its size
and popularity, the phenomenon of profile-name reuse is not
necessarily unique to this social network. In fact, we dis-
covered that two other major social networks (Tumblr and
Pinterest) also allow profile name reuse. We conclude that
freeing profile names after they are not used anymore is not
a good design choice for a social network, as it exposes its
users to security risks. We advocate for social networks to
avoid this practice, or, at least, to monitor with particu-
lar attention accounts that adopt a previously-freed profile
name.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We show that 1% of popular Twitter accounts aban-
doned their profile name between 2015 and 2016 and
had it taken over by a third party; we then provide
a number of case studies in which abandoned pro-
file names are used to spread malicious content or to
ridicule the original owner.
• We identify 196,200 accounts partaking in this prac-
tice, which shared 106,935 profile names over a period
of six months. We show that accounts that take over
abandoned profile names are more likely than regu-
lar Twitter accounts to post malicious content and get
suspended by Twitter.
3http://www.inetsolutions.org/
quickly-easily-find-high-authority-expired-twitter-accounts/
• We show that Twitter is not the only social network al-
lowing profile name reuse, but that Tumblr and Pinter-
est allow this practice too. We argue that this practice
should not be permitted because it enables malicious
users to perform reputation hijacking and imperson-
ation attacks.
2. DATA COLLECTION
Our dataset consists of a 1% random sample of all public
tweets posted on Twitter over a period of six months, be-
tween October 10, 2015 and April 12, 2016. In total, the
dataset contains 667,294,613 tweets posted by 70,803,606
distinct users (user IDs). Twitter’s streaming API provides
access to this data as a stream of JSON dictionaries that in-
clude information about the message and about the account
that posted it. We call the dataset of 70,803,606 users U.
We used the dataset U for two purposes: to extract a set of
popular profile names that were abandoned and taken by a
third party, and to identify a set of regular accounts whose
profile name was taken over. In the following, we describe
these two datasets in detail.
Popular account dataset. To extract popular profile
names that were freed and taken over by a third party, we
proceeded as follows. First, we define a popular account
as an account having at least one million followers. There-
fore, we extracted all accounts in U that had more than
one million followers at the time the data was collected.
We identified 4,263 accounts that fit that criterion. Second,
we queried the Twitter API six month after data collection
was completed to assess whether the corresponding user IDs
were still associated with the same profile names that we
observed during the data collection. After this procedure,
we obtained 42 popular profile names that were freed and
taken by another account. This is approximately 1% of all
accounts with more than one million followers. We call this
set of users, C.
For 146 popular accounts, the Twitter API did not re-
spond with valid information. In these cases, we visited the
profile URL associated with the profile name, and we also
queried the Twitter API for the user ID originally associ-
ated to that profile name. If the profile name was marked
as suspended by Twitter and the user ID was not active
anymore, we concluded that the original account was sim-
ply suspended for violating Twitter’s terms of service. If,
however, the user ID was still active but the profile name
that it had freed was blocked, we concluded that some third
party entity took it over and used it for malicious purposes
(e.g., to spread malicious content), resulting in suspension
by Twitter.
General account dataset. Besides assessing popular ac-
counts, we also analyzed the behavior of regular accounts.
To this end, we analyzed U to identify accounts that en-
gaged in profile name reuse during our observation period.
We identified 196,200 accounts that shared 106,935 profile
names during the measurement period, posting 3,290,286
tweets. These accounts constitute 0.27% of all accounts ob-
served in our sample. We call this dataset G.
Auxiliary dataset. To better characterize accounts that
partake in profile name reuse, we use a dataset of random
Twitter accounts. This dataset provides a baseline of typi-
cal behavior of accounts on Twitter and helps to highlight
differences in behavior shown by accounts involved in profile
name reuse, compared to a regular account. To this end, we
randomly sampled one million accounts from U. We call
this dataset R.
Limitations. Although our dataset allowed us to measure
the practice of profile name reuse on Twitter, it has some
limitations. First, we can only detect two accounts as shar-
ing the same profile name if they both posted tweets dur-
ing the observation period, and if these tweets were both
captured in the 1% sample that we collected. This means
that our dataset is likely to make us underestimate the phe-
nomenon of profile name reuse.
The limited visibility provided by our dataset can also im-
pact the conclusions that we draw from our analysis. While
accounts that are observed switching many profile names
during the observation period are likely to be participating
in profile name reuse schemes and are potentially malicious,
the fact that an account is present in our dataset with a sin-
gle profile name is not a guarantee that the account never
changed its profile name. As we will describe in detail in
Section 4, we took extra care in ensuring that we can infer
the profile name change history of an account, but some of
these limitations persist.
Ethics. Dealing with social network data raises ethical con-
cerns. In this paper, we only used publicly-available Twit-
ter data, and we successfully obtained ethics approval from
the University College London ethics committee (Project ID
6521/004). To treat data ethically, we followed the guide-
lines outlined by Rivers et al. [22]. In particular, we ensured
not to link multiple datasets together with the goal of fur-
ther deanonymizing the users contained in them, and we
stored our data according to the UCL Data Protection Of-
ficer guidelines.
3. PROFILE NAME REUSE FOR POPULAR
TWITTER ACCOUNTS
One of the main reasons for someone to take an aban-
doned profile name on Twitter is to hijack the “name recog-
nition” held by that account. This opens up the oppor-
tunity for malicious actors to reach a larger audience and
mount impersonation attacks. To understand the reasons
why people take over abandoned Twitter profile names, we
analyzed the accounts in the dataset C in detail. To recap,
the profile names of these accounts belonged to popular ac-
counts with more than one million followers. These accounts
then changed their profile name, which was taken over by
other accounts. In total, we found that 42 profile names
were abandoned and taken over by another user. This ac-
counts for approximately 1% of all accounts that appear in
our sample and have more that one million followers. Com-
paring this number with the profile names that are reused
in the dataset G presented in the previous section, we can
conclude that popular accounts are four times more likely
to have their profile name reused than generic Twitter ac-
counts. We then analyzed these accounts in more detail to
find out the reasons behind profile name reuse for popular
accounts. Broadly speaking, we identified four trends.
Profile names taken over by a third party with no
malicious activity. As mentioned earlier, profile name
reuse is not necessarily malicious. A Twitter user could
select a profile name that was previously in use by mere
chance (e.g., in the case of people with the same first and
last names), or they could do that on purpose, but without
a malicious intention (e.g., a fan of a celebrity who has the
chance to take that person’s old profile name). We observed
nine cases in which popular accounts changed their name
and were taken over by someone else without a clear mali-
cious intention. These examples include the old profile name
of singer Lorde (@lordemusic), which is now owned by an
account whose tweets are private, and the old profile name
of the TV show “The Big Bang Theory” (@BigBang_CBS),
which is now owned by the official fan club of the series.
Profile names taken over by a third party to set up
a parody account. The reputation that a Twitter profile
name gains over the years makes it a useful asset for people
who want to discredit or just ridicule public figures. We ob-
served two cases were popular accounts changed their profile
name and their old names were taken over by parody ac-
counts: Brazilian footballer Alex De Souza (@Alex10Combr)
and Colombian radio host Vicky Davila (@vickydavilafm).
While parody is not a malicious activity and falls under
free speech, chances are that the original owners of those ac-
counts did not intend to give visibility to accounts portray-
ing them in a satirical fashion. Allowing anyone to adopt
a freed profile name, however, can make it easier for such
parody accounts to gain popularity. Moreover, not all par-
ody accounts are harmless. An example is what happened
to Annaliese Nielsen, an activist who recorded a video of
her arguing with a minicab driver and threatening to ruin
his reputation. This video generated outrage in certain on-
line communities [11], causing the activist to be harassed
on Twitter, to the point that she eventually deleted her ac-
count. The freed profile name (@tornadoliese) was then
taken over by trolls, who then set up a parody account in
which they ridicule the former owner. This example shows
how allowing profile name reuse on Twitter can introduce a
new attack vector for online harassment.
Profile names taken over by a third party with clear
malicious intentions. We identified that twenty profile
names that were freed by their owners, were subsequently
used in violation of Twitter’s terms of service, and were even-
tually suspended. Examples of these profile names include
highly visible television outfits, such as, BBC Science News
(@bbcscitech) and the Entertainment Channel (@eonline).
These high-profile incidents show that attackers are actively
using the reputation gained by popular profile names to per-
form malicious activity. Unfortunately, we were not able
to collect evidence of the specific type of malicious activity
performed by these accounts before they were suspended by
Twitter since the offending behavior was not part of our 1%
sample.
Profile names “protected” by a placeholder account.
The aforementioned case studies show examples of how ma-
licious actors are misusing abandoned profile names to their
advantage. Unfortunately, Twitter does not provide an easy
countermeasure for users who want to change their profile
name, while not allowing anyone else to take the old one.
We observe that some people managing popular Twitter ac-
counts understand the risks of profile-name reuse, and over-
come this problem by creating placeholder accounts that
take the old profile name. These accounts usually do not
post messages, but have a pointer in their profile descrip-
tion to the new profile name of the account. This strategy
has been adopted by high-profile accounts such as Manch-
ester City Football Club (@MCFC) and singer Enrique Iglesias
(@enrique305).
4. PROFILE NAME REUSE IN GENERAL
TWITTER ACCOUNTS
In this section we analyze the accounts in our dataset G in
detail, with the goal of understanding the reasons why pro-
file names are reused on Twitter, and measure the modus
operandi of accounts that are switching between multiple
profile names. We start by defining different types of ac-
counts involved in profile-name reuse, and we continue with
a detailed measurement of their characteristics and activity.
We then look for the presence of links pointing to aban-
doned profile names, and investigate the possibility of using
these links for SEO purposes, and to inflate the popularity
of Twitter accounts. Finally, we go through some interest-
ing case studies, exposing complex ecosystems of accounts
sharing profile names and posting about common topics.
4.1 Types of accounts involved in profile name
reuse
Accounts can be involved in profile-name reuse from var-
ious perspectives. There are accounts changing their pro-
file name and taking another one, which was never held by
another account, accounts that take an abandoned profile
name upon creation without knowing it, and accounts that
systematically take abandoned profile names for their gain
(for example to hijack the reputation linked to those pro-
file names). We group these activities into three types of
accounts as follows:
First unique account. This type of account represents the
typical behavior of a user changing their profile name and
taking another one that was never used before, or deleting
their account and consequently freeing its profile name. We
consider an account as belonging to this group if it is the first
one in our dataset holding the original profile name, and if it
is the first one holding the new profile name of their choice
as well. As we will explain later, if an account changes its
profile name to a name that was previously used, or changes
its profile name more than once during the measurement
period, we consider this account as a “multi account.” Note
that some misclassifications are still possible for this cate-
gory, in particular if the account used multiple profile names
in the past and this was not captured by our dataset. We
observed 101,244 accounts (over 196,200 total accounts) be-
longing to this category (that is, first unique).
Second unique account. This type of account is one that
holds a single profile name in our dataset, and that profile
name was freed by another account. These accounts repre-
sent the cases in which an account takes a profile name that
was previously used, either by chance or on purpose. One
possibility is that the abandoned profile name is a popular
first and last name (e.g., @johnsmith) and someone happens
to have that same first and last name, or that an account
owner decides to delete their account and start over again,
using the previous profile name. Due to the limitations in
our dataset, it is possible that a profile name switched be-
tween other profile names in the past and we did not record
that. To mitigate this problem, we look at the creation date
of each account. If the creation date is before the last time
in which the first unique user corresponding to that profile
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function of the time since
the opening of first, second, and multi user accounts.
name tweeted, it means that the account was already active
back then, holding a different profile name that we did not
observe. In this case, we consider the account as a “multi
account.” We observed 15,911 second unique accounts in our
dataset.
Multi accounts. These are the accounts that switched
among more than two profile names. They are either ob-
served holding three or more profile names in our dataset
(two profile names that were previously used by someone
else), or they are identified by following the procedures ex-
plained in the previous two categories. Multi accounts rep-
resent a systematic behavior in which an account changed
many profile names, potentially to hijack the reputation of
those names. We observed 79,045 accounts of this type in
our dataset.
4.2 General characteristics of accounts reusing
profile names
The first analysis that we performed was looking at the
general characteristics of accounts reusing profile names. For
each type of account described in the previous section, we
obtained its creation time, its number of followers, and its
number of tweets. We first looked at the life span of ac-
counts reusing profile names. A Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of this metric for the different types of ac-
counts is reported in Figure 1. The figure shows that second
unique accounts are younger because, by definition, they are
using only one profile name that has already been used by
someone else during the measurement period. The earliest
account creation time for them is therefore the beginning of
the measurement period. Multi accounts are also generally
younger than first unique accounts.
We then wanted to quantify the activity levels of the dif-
ferent types of accounts on Twitter. To this end, we studied
the number of tweets posted on Twitter by the various types
of accounts involved in profile name reuse compared to the
activity of the random sample of one million accounts in
R. Figure 2 shows the average number of tweets posted by
the accounts in our dataset per day. Accounts that are in-
volved in profile name reuse generally post less tweets than
the general Twitter population. First unique and multi ac-
counts do not seem to show a significantly different posting
0 20 40 60 80 100
Average statuses count per day
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Multi accounts
Random accounts
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of the number of
tweets per day of first, second, and multi accounts.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of the number of
followers per day of first, second, and multi accounts.
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Figure 4: CDF of the percentage of common words across
the tweets of the different accounts that shared the same
profile name.
behavior, while second unique accounts are much less ac-
tive than the others, with 90% of them posting less than 10
tweets per day. As we mentioned in Section 2, this large
discrepancy between the accounts under consideration and
the random set of Twitter accounts could be due to our col-
lection methodology for R accounts.
As another general characteristic of Twitter accounts, we
decided to investigate the number of followers of the ac-
counts under consideration. The number of followers is com-
monly regarded as a measure of reputation on Twitter [26],
and it ultimately regulates how many users will see the sta-
tuses posted by an account. To exclude biases due to the
age of accounts, we plotted the CDF of the average num-
ber of followers gained per day (Figure 3). Interestingly,
multi accounts are able to attract more followers on average
than general accounts, showing that switching profile name
to popular ones could help in gaining more followers. First
unique accounts also attract more followers than random
accounts, while the number of followers obtained by second
unique accounts is still less than for the other types.
Themes discussed by accounts reusing profile names.
Next to obtaining general statistics about the activity as-
sociated with accounts involved in profile-name reuse, we
wanted to understand the popular themes that these ac-
counts tweet about. We also wanted to understand if the
different accounts reusing profile names were tweeting about
different themes or not. To achieve this, we conducted Term
Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) analysis
on the text of the tweets. TF-IDF extracts important words
within a given text corpus, and the important words in turn
provide information about the general theme(s) of the text
corpus.
Before carrying out TF-IDF analysis, we preprocessed the
text corpus as follows. First, we removed all non-English
tweets; to identify such tweets, we just need to check the
language from the tweet metadata contained in the JSON
objects returned by the Twitter API. We could have used on-
line automatic translation tools to translate the non-English
text to English, but we found that they fail to translate some
of the tweets properly. Besides, automatic translation would
result in some loss of context which might bias our results.
Second, we filtered out all words with less than five charac-
ters, and also removed all non-printable characters. We then
carried out the TF-IDF analysis on the resulting text. In
total, we processed tweets in English from 54,238 accounts
associated with 26,678 profile names during the period of
observation.
Figure 4 shows the CDF of the percentage of common
words across the tweets of the different accounts that shared
the same profile name. The words were extracted through
TF-IDF analysis as earlier described. As it can be seen, 80%
of the accounts that shared profile names had less than 3%
words in common. This can be an indicator that accounts
reusing a profile name are often not controlled by the previ-
ous owner, hence they tweet about completely different top-
ics. We also grouped the important words we obtained from
TF-IDF analysis into different themes. The main themes
we identified included Blog, Music, Porn, Video, Follow,
Celebrities, Business, Retweet, and Football. For example,
the Video theme comprises the following related words: video,
youtube, live, stream, and vine. We discovered that second
unique accounts are more likely to tweet about follow-back
schemes, blogs, football, and business, than other themes.
As we show in Section 4.6, many second unique accounts en-
gage in follow-back schemes. It is worth noting that, among
other patterns, we discovered that a significant fraction of
the tweets of multi accounts is about “business.”
4.3 IDs and profile-name-sharing behaviors
Random accounts Reuse accounts First unique Second unique Multi
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Figure 5: Ratio of user IDs sharing profile names that were
suspended or deleted, compared to the ratio of random ac-
counts. “Reuse accounts” comprises all accounts that shared
profile names, regardless of their typology.
We wanted to understand the sharing behavior of profile
names by accounts in G. In other words, we wanted to look
into how many accounts share the same profile name, and
understand the complex dynamics of accounts which change
their profile name multiple times. Most of the accounts in G
(90%) had only one profile name. Similarly, most of the pro-
file names that were involved in profile name sharing (94%)
were using only two different profile names. As we discussed
in Section 4.1 these measurements are likely to be a lower
bound of the actual phenomenon, due to limitations in our
dataset. In Section 4.6 we will provide evidence of elaborate
profile-name-sharing schemes, in which groups of accounts
share a set of profile names among themselves.
4.4 Suspension and deletion dynamics of
accounts reusing profile names
Taking another account’s abandoned profile name is not
an indicator of malicious intentions per se. As we have dis-
cussed, however, the possibility of taking abandoned profile
names can facilitate malicious activity due to reputation hi-
jacking and impersonation opportunities. As an indicator of
malicious activity, we wanted to understand to what extent
accounts taking part in profile name reuse get suspended
by Twitter. There are many reasons why an account can
get suspended, including sending spam or impersonating an-
other person.4
To assess the current status of a Twitter account, we pro-
ceed as follows. First, we take advantage of the Twitter API
to see if an account is still active at the time of check. If
it is not, it might be the case that the account was deleted
by the owner, or that it was suspended by Twitter because
of a violation of the terms of service. As we mentioned in
Section 1, when an account gets suspended by Twitter its
profile name does not get freed. We can take advantage
of this fact to determine if the account was suspended (in
case its associated profile name is not available anymore on
Twitter) or whether it was deleted. This technique is not
flawless, because it could happen that an account changes its
profile name and gets suspended later on — in this case, the
original profile name with which we observed the account
would be freed, and we would erroneously consider the ac-
count to be deleted instead of suspended. We acknowledge
this problem but also believe that this happens rarely and
therefore does not affect the nature of the observed trends.
We applied the aforementioned technique to our dataset of
accounts involved in profile reuse, as well as to the dataset of
one million random Twitter accounts (R). Figure 5 reports
a summary of these results. For random Twitter accounts,
the ratio of suspension is 5%, while the ratio of accounts
being deleted is 12%. If we look at the overall situation of
accounts reusing profile names, regardless of their type (first
4https://twitter.com/tos
unique, second unique, multi), the fraction of suspended ac-
counts is slightly lower (3%) while the one of deleted ac-
counts is slightly higher (14%). These numbers are however
influenced by the fact that the set of first unique accounts
does not contain any suspended account. This makes sense
since, by design, first unique accounts released their pro-
file name for somebody else to take, and this profile name
would have not been made available if the accounts were
suspended. 24.5% of the first unique accounts deleted their
profile during the measurement period, while the remaining
ones simply changed their profile name, thereby releasing
the old one.
Interestingly, second unique accounts have a ratio for sus-
pension that is much higher than random accounts (10%).
This could be due to the fact that many of these accounts are
aggressively sending spam, as we will show in Section 4.6.
Multi accounts have a slightly higher rate of suspension than
random accounts (5.6%), but this small increase suggests
that many of these accounts are involved in schemes that
are not clearly malicious, such as schemes for reputation
boosting (see Section 4.6).
4.5 Analysis of web links towards reused
profile names
In this section, we describe our analysis of the backlinks of
reused Twitter user names, in an effort to quantify the mis-
placed trust that websites have bestowed upon these names.
To this end, we started with the set G of 106,935 Twitter
profile names that were reused. We carried out this analysis
immediately after the end of the data collection phase. We
used Moz-Open Site Explorer5 to gather inbound links for
each Twitter profile name contained in our set. We discov-
ered that out of the 106,935 profile names, 12,037 (11.3%)
of them had active inbound links on the web. The total
number of discovered inbound links for these 12,037 profile
names was 20,457. Next, for each page hosting a link to
a reused Twitter account, we gathered three additional at-
tributes, namely, its Rank, Safety, and Category. The Rank
attribute is the Alexa rank of a linking page’s main domain
(TLD + 1) and was sourced from lookups in Alexa’s top one
million dataset, as well as scraping of Alexa’s API6 for the
links having ranks greater than one million. In this manner,
we were able to collect Rank information for 19,178 pages,
leaving 1,279 pages without rank information. The cate-
gories of Safety and Category were provided by Trendmi-
cro’s public website categorization engine7. We found that
the vast majority of domains linking to the hijacked Twitter
user names are safe sites and not exploit-ridden sites that
link to Twitter accounts for SEO purposes. We also found
that the vast majority of websites linking to reused Twit-
ter user names are popular benign websites with ranks that
imply thousands of visitors on a daily basis.
The discovered websites belong to a wide range of cate-
gories. The top three categories are Social Networks, Com-
puters and Internet, and Sports, in that order. The remain-
ing categories include Entertainment, News/Media, and Pol-
itics, among others.
We wanted to see if multi accounts have a preference for
reusing profile names with more links pointing to them. We
5https://moz.com/researchtools/ose
6http://data.alexa.com/data?cli=10&url=alexa.com
7http://global.sitesafety.trendmicro.com
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Figure 6: CDFs of link distribution per group of accounts
associated with reused Twitter user name.
counted the number of links pointing to profile names that
were reused at some point during our observation, group-
ing the accounts as earlier described (that is, second unique
and multi account groupings). We found that users in the
multi accounts category have a higher preference for reusing
profile names that have more links pointing to them, than
second unique accounts, likely for SEO purposes. Figure 6
highlights this observation, which we confirmed by applying
chi-square tests to the data. Specifically, we tested the hy-
pothesis that multi accounts have more websites linking to
them with respect to second accounts. We tested the two
categories by dividing the accounts in those to which at least
two links in the wild were pointing at or not. The p-value of
the statistical test is less than 0.0001, stating that there is
evidence of difference between multi and second accounts.
Multi accounts have more websites pointing to them with
respect to second unique ones, therefore this means that
multi accounts are more likely to use profile names that have
multiple links on the web pointing to them. We further ob-
served that the majority of Twitter accounts in our dataset
that reuse profile names and have inbound links have less
than ten such links, with around 90% of accounts having
five or less inbound links.
Overall, if we combine the information of ranking, cat-
egory, and links pointing to reused profile names, we can
safely conclude that the majority of websites linking to these
hijacked Twitter user names are popular benign sites which
have no knowledge of the fact that they are no longer linking
to the accounts of popular users and celebrities, but rather
to accounts that are now under the control of potentially
malicious users. This confirms that profile name reuse in
social networks is far from a theoretical danger since it is
already happening in the wild.
4.6 Case studies
In this section, we analyze two case studies of accounts
reusing profile names. These examples show different ways
in which abandoned profile names are used in the wild.
Activity of second unique accounts. In Section 4.4 we
showed that second unique accounts have a higher chance
to get suspended by Twitter (10% compared to 5% for a
random population of accounts). We investigated possible
Service Allows change Allows reuse
Facebook 3 7
Google+ 7 7
LinkedIn 3 7
Pinterest 3 3
Reddit 7 7
Snapchat 7 7
Tumblr 3 3
Twitter 3 3
Youtube 7 7
Table 1: Possibility of changing user name on popular online
social networks. With the exception of Google+, Youtube,
Reddit, and Snapchat, all other popular social networks al-
low users to change their user name. Moreover, Twitter,
Pinterest, and Tumblr allow users to take a user name that
used to belong to another account. This policy makes these
social networks vulnerable to user name squatting.
reasons why these accounts could have been suspended. We
could not identify a common theme, since the activity of
most accounts seemed unrelated to each other. We, however,
identified evidence of accounts sharing links to YouTube
videos that are now deleted for violation of their terms of
service, as well as links pointing to malware and pornogra-
phy. We also identified accounts from this type engaging in
follow-back schemes [26]. Our hypothesis is that these ac-
counts obtained abandoned profile names and started post-
ing malicious content, hoping to leverage the residual pop-
ularity of these accounts to attract more victims.
A group of accounts sharing profile names. We iden-
tified an interesting group of 48 accounts that shared 187
distinct profile names. Every time one of the accounts re-
leased a profile name, another one took it. Figure 7 shows
the timeline of this case study. Overall, the accounts in-
volved in it changed profile name 246 times, often taking
names that were previously abandoned. These accounts ap-
peared to portray models from Asia, and the accounts were
tweeting in Indonesian. One of the popular words that ap-
peared in the tweets sent by these accounts was “follow,”
indicating that the accounts that reused those profile names
were likely involved in follow-back schemes, similar to the
ones presented in previous work [26].
5. DISCUSSION
In this section we first aim to understand whether the
problem of profile name reuse is unique to Twitter. We
then reason about our findings and offer some suggestions
that social networks should put in place to avoid the security
problems highlighted in this paper.
5.1 Profile name reuse on other
social networks
In this paper, we analyzed the phenomenon of profile
name reuse on Twitter. As a further step, we wanted to un-
derstand to what extent other popular social networks allow
their users to change their user name. To this end, we ex-
amined the terms of service of eight popular social networks
other than Twitter: Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Pinter-
est, Reddit, Snapchat, Tumblr, and Youtube. We looked
for clauses specifying whether a user is allowed to change
their user name and if the released user name can be used
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Figure 7: Timeline of a group of 48 accounts that shared 187 distinct profile names during the measurement period. Each
line shows a different account, while the Y axis shows different profile names. Each dot represents a tweet sent by the account
with a certain profile name. As it can be seen, accounts in this group typically changed profile name multiple times over
the measurement period. It also happened in multiple occasions that a previously freed profile name was taken by another
account in the group.
by other users in the future. In case the terms of service did
not contain a definite answer to these questions, we created
two accounts on the platform, a1 and a2. We then changed
a1’s user name (if that was allowed), and set up a2 to pick
a1’s old user name, checking if this was allowed. The results
of our investigation are summarized in Table 1. We identi-
fied three categories of social networks, illustrated in detail
in the following.
Social networks not allowing a change of user name.
These social networks present the strictest settings, not al-
lowing users to change their user name at all. Reddit8 and
Snapchat9 belong to this group. Google+ and Youtube al-
low users to change the name of their profile up to three
times in 90 days. This name is the one listed on the profile
page of a user and used to directly mention her, but is not
part of the URL of the profile page. At the same time, users
are also allowed to set a handle for their page or channel,
which allows people to more easily remember the URL as-
sociated to it (e.g., https://youtube.com/taylorswiftVEVO).
After this name has been set, however, it is not possible to
change it anymore.10 We mark both Google+ and Youtube
as social networks that do not allow a profile name change.
Social networks allowing a change of user name, but
not its reuse. Similar to Google+ and Youtube, Facebook
and LinkedIn also allow users to change their name — a
legitimate use of this being, for example, a user changing
their last name after their spouse’s. Moreover, Facebook11
8https://www.reddit.com/r/help/wiki/faq
9https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/change-username
10https://support.google.com/plus/answer/2676340
11https://www.facebook.com/help/203523569682738
and LinkedIn12 allow users to change the user name that is
associated to the URL of their public profile page. Facebook,
however, limits their users to a single change of user name in
the account’s lifetime. More importantly, after a user name
is changed on these networks, it is not made available for
others to use. Facebook and LinkedIn, therefore, are not
vulnerable to the type of impersonation attacks described
in this paper.
Social networks allowing both a change of user name
and its reuse. Finally, Pinterest13 and Tumblr14 match
Twitter’s capability in profile name reuse, both allowing
users to change their user name and return the old user
name to the pool of available ones. A user name on these
networks identifies both the user, and the URL of their pro-
file page (or their blog in the case of Tumblr). As a partial
mitigation, Tumblr releases the old user name only after 24
hours from the change. These findings show that the se-
curity issues and the phenomena highlighted in this paper
are not unique to Twitter, but can be found on other social
networks too.
5.2 Recommendations to social networks
By using large-scale measurements and individual case
studies, in this paper we described the problem of profile-
name reuse on Twitter and how other social networks that
follow similar name-reuse choices will likely suffer from the
same type of abuse. We acknowledge that allowing profile
name reuse can have some benefits and it is a user friendly
policy that gives a high degree of freedom to users. We
12https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
20140424124611-12064186-how-to-customize-your-\
linkedin-public-profile-url
13https://help.pinterest.com/en/articles/edit-your-profile
14https://www.tumblr.com/docs/en/blog management
showed, however, that this policy also has security implica-
tions.
The best solution to these security issues is, in our opin-
ion, not to allow accounts to reuse abandoned profile names.
Some social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn allow
the change of user name, but they do not allow the reuse of
profile names that have already been used by someone; we
suggest that Twitter, Tumblr, and Pinterest should adopt
a similar policy to easily and effectively tackle the problem.
As a less strict approach, social networks could allow ac-
counts to take abandoned profile names, but should then
start monitoring them for signs of malicious activity.
6. RELATED WORK
Being one of the most popular online social networks,
Twitter attracted significant interest from the research com-
munity, who studied its general characteristics [15], how rep-
utation on the network works [5], investigated peculiar traits
of the service, in particular its microblogging features [16],
and looked at the unfollow patterns of Twitter users [12].
Particular focus was given to the security issues around
Twitter. Grier et al. performed the first large-scale study
of abuse on the platform [10], while Thomas et al. studied
marketplaces where one can buy fake Twitter accounts [29].
Stringhini et al. studied services that sell compromised ac-
counts as followers to customers that are willing to pay for
them [23, 26]. De Cristofaro et al. studied the ecosystem
of services that deliver likes to the Facebook pages of their
customers [6]. Based on the insights from this research, a
number of systems have been proposed to detect malicious
activity on Twitter, such as fake accounts [3, 17, 18, 24, 28],
compromised accounts [8] or malicious accounts controlled
by botnets [4, 25, 31]. Goga et al. studied the problem of
impersonation on Twitter [9]. In this work, we showed how
reusing abandoned profile names could facilitate the imper-
sonation problem on Twitter.
The problem of profile name reuse on Twitter was origi-
nally presented in our preliminary work [20]. In that previ-
ous paper, we identified the security issues linked to profile
name reuse on Twitter, identified 19,000 profile names that
had been reused over a period of one month, and provided
general statistics about them. In this paper, we took the
study much further, analyzing more accounts for a much
longer period of time, and performing a deeper analysis on
the modus operandi and characteristics of accounts that
reuse abandoned Twitter profile names. Jain et al. also
published a study in which they show that users on Twitter
temporarily change their profile names [13].
The problem of profile name reuse shares certain similar-
ities with the phenomenon of cybersquatting since attackers
essentially squat profile names that they do not own in an
attempt to confuse visitors about the nature of a Twitter
account. In a similar fashion, in domain squatting, attack-
ers register domains that are confusingly similar to popular
authoritative domain names, and abuse this similarity for
various types of advertising fraud, phishing, and malware
delivery [1, 2, 7, 14,21,27,30].
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the phenomenon of profile name
reuse on Twitter. We identified a number of interesting ways
in which profile names are reused, some of which are mali-
cious. We also showed that Twitter is not the only social
network vulnerable to the issues highlighted in this paper.
We hope that this work will help to raise awareness of the
issues with freeing profile names after they have been aban-
doned.
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